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STUDENT NOTES AND RECENT CASES

TRIkL--IMPROPER CONDUCT-ARGUMENT AND REMARKS OF COUN-

a servant's personal injury action,
based on negligence, in the opening statement, and again on cross
examination of defendant's witnesses, and was again about to be
introduced into the argument, notwithstanding instructions that
the question of insurance had nothing to do with the case. The
objections were made seasonably by defendant's counsel and were
accompanied each time by a motion for the discharge of the jury.
After a verdict for plaintiff, defendant appealed. Held, the improper conduct of plaintiff's counsel was sufficient to contsitute
reversible error. Rhinehart & Dennis Co., Inc., v. Brown, 120 S. E.
269 (Va. 1923).
This case followed the dicta in the earlier case of P. Lorillard
Co., v. Clay, 127 Va. 734, 104 S. E. 384, which was, in substance,
that a reference to the fact that D was protected with casualty
insurance, while highly improper, was not reversible error as it
was not objected to when made, and also the holdings in Akin v.
Lee, 206 N. Y. 20, 99 N. E. 85; Edward v. Earnest, 206 Ala. 1,
89 S. 729; Bishop v. Chicago R. R. Co., 289 Ill. 63, 124 N. E.
312, and many other cases from other jurisdictions. This first decision of its kind in Virginia, however, and there is no case directly in point in the West Virginia decisions. In the two reported
decisions available, touching on the introduction of casualty insurance in tort actions based on negligence in West Virginia,
Walters v. Appalachian Power Company, 75 W. Va. 676, 84 S. E.
617, and Christie v. Mitchell, 93 W. Va. 200, 116 S. E. 715, the
question of improper conduct does not arise.
The general rule of evidence as to the inadmissibility of the
fact of casualty insurance in tort actions based on negligence is
too well settled to require comment.. WIGMORE, EVDENCE, § 282,
and cases cited. It was upon this rule that the reversal for improper conduct, consisting of the attempts of plaintiff's counsel
to introduce in his argument and elsewhere that which the above
SI,,L-REVERSIBLE ERRR.-In
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rule of evidence prevented him from introducing into the evidence,
was based.
In the decisions of criminal cases in West Virginia, in which
cases, historically at least, the rules of evidence should be applied
with more vigor than in civil actions, we have one rule worded two
ways. The first is that laid down in State v. Shores, 31 W. Va.
391, 7 S. E. 413, which held, "Counsel necessarily have great lattitude in the argument of a case and it is, of course, wihtin the
discretion of the court to restrain them, but with this discretion
of the court to restrain them, but with this discretion the appellate
court will not interfere unless it clearly appears from the record
that the rights of the prisoner were prejudiced by such line of
argument." This holding was restated verbatim in State v. Allen,
45 W. Va. 65, 30 S. E. 209, and in State v. Clifford, 58 W. Va.
681, 52 S. E. 864, as the rule in this state. In no one of these three
cases was the decision made on this point, showing that in the mind
of the court the rights of the prisoner were not prejudiced by the
line of argument objected to. Of the first two, the argument was
made in reply to argument of opposing counsel and the third was
rather more oratorical and irritating than prejudicial.
The second statement of the rule in point in criminal actions
is that stated by the court in State v. Huff, 80 W. Va. 468, 92
S. E. 681, which was, "Remarks or conduct by a prosecuting
attorney before the jury during the progress of a criminal trial
will not constitute reversible error, especially where the jury are
instructed to disregard the statements and conduct, unless it is
manifest the rights of defendant were injuriously affected." Here
however, as in the cases above cited, the remark made was in reply
to argument of defendant's counsel, and the case did not turn on
this point.
In the civil actions of West Virginia we also have two statements
of the same rule. The first is that of Landers v. Ohio River R. R.
Co., 46 W. Va. 492, 33 S. E. 296, which was an action brought by
an infant trespasser, by his next frined, for personal injuries caused by his summary removal from a moving train of defendant
by a third person at the direction of the conductor. In that case
a divided court held, "In order to authorize this court to revise
errors predicated upon the abuse of counsel of the privilege of argument, it should be made to appear that the accused requested
and was refused an instruction to the jury to disregard the unauthorized statements of the counsel," which is quoted verbatim
from Young v. State, 19 Tex. App. 536, (Syl., point 2.) The ar-
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gument objected to in the West Virginia case above consisted
mainly in the statement that a railroad was, "as heartless as
marble; that it had no wife, no child, no life; that its management
through its agents was as devilish as it could be." And later,
"Every inducement in trying to get them (other employees acting
as witnesses for the defendant) to misrepresent the facts if there
is a wrong committed, and make the railroad free from damages
is used."
It is apparent that the line of argument used in this ease is not
as prejudicial as that in the Virginia case first cited. But from
the rule laid down by the West Virginia court, which would cover
a case similar to the Virginia case if it arose in West Virginia,
it logically follows that, if an instruction were requested and given, in a civil action, the appellate court would probably reverse,
regardless of result. This view is strengthened by the other and
latest decision in point in West Virginia, Hodge v. CharlestonInterrurban Railroad Company, 79 W. Va. 174 90 S. E. 601. This
case holds "Caution to counsel and judicial declaration that matter is not in evidence effects a substantial elimination of the remarks
from jury consideration." While this was true on the facts of the
cases last cited, it is clearly apparent that impressions and prejudices made on the minds of a jury by improper remarks and
argument cannot always be eradicated by an instruction or a judicial declaration. (This situation in West Virginia seems all the
more peculiar, since it was held as long as 1893 in Neil et al v.
Rogers Brothers Produce Company, 38 W.Va.228, 18 S.E. 563, that
the remark of the trial judge on the statements of defendant's
witness, "They are clearly contradictory," to be reversible error
on the ground that the error could only be obviated by discharging
the jury. Although, of course, a jury ordinarily gives the remark
of a judge much more weight than a remark of counsel.)
It is submitted that the rule of Rhinehart & Dennis Co., v.
Brown, supra, is a more wholesome decision as it removes in a
large measure the temptation from counsel to introduce material
in their remarks and argument which is inadmissible in evidence.
The rule should probably be qualified to this extent, that where it
is clear beyond the shadow of a doubt that no prejudice arose
from such conduct, reversal should not follow.
The efficacy of the rule in the case last cited may be weakened
somewhat by the fact that the case was also reversible on the
weight of the evidence.
-C. M.L L., Jr.
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